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Abstract 
 
 
The development of the Internet as a medium for the dissemination of corporate financial 
information creates a new reporting environment. Extensive literature examines the extent 
and determinants of voluntary financial reporting through traditional mediums such as paper 
based annual reports. This paper extends this literature by examining the extent and 
determinants of voluntary corporate Internet financial reporting (IFR) by New Zealand 
companies. The results indicate that some determinants of traditional financial reporting 
such as firm size and spread of shareholding are influential determinants of IFR. However, 
other characteristics such as liquidity do not significantly explain the choice to use Internet 
as a medium for corporate financial reporting. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Internet financial reporting (IFR) is a recent but fast-growing phenomenon.1 Many companies 
worldwide are taking the opportunity provided by the worldwide web (WWW) to publish 
their corporate financial information. This practice is expected to grow in the near future, with 
possible wide-ranging implications for financial information providers, consumers, auditors 
and regulators, among others. Recent studies document the extent of the practice among 
companies listed in a number of countries (e.g., UK (Craven and Marston, 1999), Austria and 
Germany (Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999), US and Canada (Trites, 1999), USA, UK and 
Germany (Deller, Stubenrath, and Weber, 1999), Sweden (Hedlin, 1999), Spain (Gowthorpe 
and Amat, 1999)), including international comparison (such as Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and 
Rahman, 1999). An examination of developments among companies listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange (Fisher et al, 1999) indicates that many of them use the web for the 
dissemination of their financial information. 
 
Despite the growing use of the Internet as a medium for the dissemination of corporate 
information, some companies either do not have a corporate website, or are not using their 
website to disseminate such information. Substantial accounting literature has emerged in the 
last thirty years that explains corporate financial reporting behaviour. This literature focuses 
primarily on the voluntary provision of financial information through the traditional medium 
of paper-based annual reports. The development of Internet as a medium for the distribution 
of corporate financial information creates a new corporate reporting environment that may be 
different from the traditional paper-based one. 
 
This paper examines the extent of IFR by New Zealand companies and the determinants of 
their WWW presence and IFR practices. The determinants of IFR practices have not been 
examined in depth (Craven and Marston, 1999). The examination of such determinants 
extends the theories and models which have been examined in voluntary reporting through 
traditional mediums to the new corporate reporting environment created by the Internet. The 
results of our analysis indicate that size, spread of shareholding and efficiency are the primary 
determinants of IFR practices among New Zealand companies. Other predictors of voluntary 
                                                     
1 See for example, Petravick and Gillett (1996); Flynn and Galthorpe (1997); Koreto (1997); Lymer (1997); Lymer and 
Tallberg (1997); Wildstrom (1997); Brennan and Hourigan (1998); Marston and Leow (1998); Craven and Marston 
(1999); Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999); Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and Rahman, (1999); Trites (1999); Deller, 
Stubenrath, and Weber (1999); Hedlin (1999); Gowthorpe and Amat (1999). 
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reporting, industrial grouping and foreign affiliation, are not significantly associated with the 
practice of IFR. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a review of the 
literature on the theoretical and empirical findings of corporate financial reporting in general 
and literature on IFR in particular. Section 3 describes the research hypotheses. This is 
followed by a description of the research methods, including data collection and analysis, 
used in the study. The results and findings of the study are then presented and discussed. 
Summary and conclusions, including possible limitations and areas for future research are 
presented in the final section. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Considerable literature has emerged in the last thirty years that examines voluntary corporate 
financial reporting. Further literature has emerged which examines practices and issues 
relating to the recent development of the Internet as a medium for dissemination of corporate 
financial information. This section provides a review of both aspects. 
 
2.1  Determinants of Corporate Financial Reporting  
 
The investigation of the determinants of disclosure in hard-copy corporate annual reports 
represents one of the most systematic and sustained research efforts in the financial reporting 
literature.  Cerf’s (1961) inaugural empirical study of factors influencing the adequacy of US 
corporate annual report disclosure laid the foundation for a succession of studies conducted in 
numerous countries (e.g., Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Ahmed, 1996), Hong 
Kong (Tai et al., 1990; Lau, 1992; Wallace and Naser, 1995), India (Singhvi, 1968; Marston 
and Robson, 1997), Japan (Cooke, 1991, 1992, 1993), Mexico (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987), 
New Zealand (Courtis, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Hossain et al., 1995), Sweden (Cooke, 
1989a, 1989b), UK (Firth, 1979), and USA (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Malone 
et al., 1993)).  Variables hypothesised to influence disclosure levels in these studies include a 
variety of firm specific characteristics, such as size, profitability, listing status, size of the 
firm’s auditors, and leverage.  
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The level of researcher interest in this area directly reflects the impact that the adequacy of 
financial report disclosure has on decisions made by the various users of hard-copy financial 
statements, and more generally, the efficiency of capital markets.  The findings of this stream 
of research have particular implications for regulators responsible for ensuring high quality 
financial report disclosure, such as New Zealand’s Accounting Standards Review Board, and 
the US’s Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Accounting Standards Board.  
The fact that systematic differences in hard-copy financial report disclosure have been found 
among firms within and across industries, lends weight to the argument that efficient solutions 
are being found in the market for financial information (Malone et al., 1993; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995).  Evidence of market efficiency, such as this, should not be a complete surprise 
given Benston’s (1969) finding that voluntary disclosure was not uncommon in the US prior 
to disclosure regulation imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Regulators can use 
research findings regarding determinants of disclosure to further their understanding of the 
existing market for financial information before determining whether intervention is 
necessary.  Regulators are more likely to consider that regulation is warranted where they 
perceive the existence of ‘market failures’, such as where disclosure levels are non-optimal in 
a Pareto sense, or where current levels of disclosure are considered  “inequitable” in the sense 
that market participants are not factoring in all costs or benefits, e.g., social costs and benefits 
are being omitted from the cost/benefit considerations (Foster, 1986).  Regulators ought to be 
cautious in imposing disclosure requirements when market forces appear to be finding 
efficient solutions, as may be the case where systematic disclosure differences are found 
between firms, because firms may be placed at a relative economic disadvantage as a result of 
the direct and indirect costs of regulation (Malone et al., 1993), such as collection and 
processing costs, litigation costs, political costs, competitive disadvantage costs, constraints 
on managerial behaviour, and the costs of rewriting certain contracts (Foster, 1986; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
In addition to regulators, Ahmed and Courtis (1995) suggest that the investment community 
may be able to benefit from being made aware of systematic differences in disclosure.  For 
example, large, and highly leveraged listed companies which fail to comply with an expected 
higher level of disclosure, may be “signalling through their reticence that they have 
‘something to hide’” (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999, p. 57), thus alerting investors to the 
possibility that more careful analysis is warranted. 
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Annual report disclosure may be either mandatory or voluntary.  Mandatory disclosure may 
arise from a number of sources, such as stock exchange listing requirements, professional 
promulgations, and statutes.  Voluntary disclosure represents disclosure in excess of 
mandatory disclosure, and in efficient markets is likely to be provided where the marginal 
benefits to the provider exceed the marginal costs.  Disclosure may also be in quantitative 
(either in dollars or other units of measure) or qualitative form.  Relatively few disclosure 
studies explicitly define what attribute of the dependent variable, disclosure, is being 
measured, and fewer still adequately reconcile the variable under study with its measurement.  
For instance, McNally et al. (1982) fail to reconcile the ‘quality’ of corporate disclosure 
practices with their measurement of the ‘extent’ of disclosure.  As Buzby (1975, p. 30) states, 
“extent of disclosure is not synonymous with adequacy of disclosure”, therefore measurement 
based on ‘extent’ “... cannot be taken as a measure of the overall quality in annual reports”.  A 
notable exception appears to be Wallace and Naser (1995) who, based on a review of the 
literature, identify five key aspects of ‘quality’ of disclosure: (1) adequate for a defined 
purpose; (2) informative; (3) timely; (4) understandable/readable; and (5) comprehensive.  In 
their study, the researchers adopted ‘comprehensiveness’ of disclosure as the dependent 
variable, and proceeded to construct a specific measure of comprehensiveness.  This leads to a 
second and compounding problem with existing research: few studies acknowledge that the 
underlying variable is not amenable to measurement (Marston and Shrives, 1991).  Again, 
Wallace and Naser (1995, p. 326) are an exception: “Financial disclosure is an abstract 
concept which cannot be measured directly.  It does not posses inherent characteristics by 
which one can determine its intensity or quality like the capacity of an automobile”.  
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, most disclosure studies measure annual report disclosure 
using a disclosure index.  Some, however, have employed a dichotomous measure. For 
example, Forker (1992) looked at share options disclosure (good/bad), while Thomas (1986) 
examined the disclosure/non-disclosure of forecast information in interim accounts.  
Depending on research objectives, disclosure index studies involve establishing a list of 
mandatory, voluntary, or aggregate disclosure items.  The sample firms’ financial reports are 
then assessed relative to this list. Although some variations to scoring do exist, a score of one 
(zero) is usually assigned for each item (not) disclosed.  Each firm’s aggregate score is then 
divided by the total number of items relevant to that firm.  The quotient represents the firm’s 
overall disclosure index score, whose value will lie somewhere between zero and one, 
inclusive (e.g., Cooke 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992, 1993; Patton and Zelenka, 1997).  Some 
studies, such as Buzby 1975, McNally et al., 1982, assigned weights to each disclosure item, 
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based on the assessment of each item’s importance by a particular class of user, e.g., financial 
analysts.  Other studies, however, have dispensed with the use of weights on the basis that (1) 
using only one or two user groups results in weights not representative of all user classes, 
whereas using a multitude of user groups will result in an unwieldy study (Cooke, 1989a), (2) 
as there are no real economic consequences for subject raters, their assessments may not 
reflect their actual use of each item (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987), and (3) the results of 
using weighted and unweighted disclosure indices may not be statistically significantly 
different from each other (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987).  A more detailed description and 
critique of the use of disclosure indices can be found in Marston and Shrives (1991). 
 
As discussed above, a wide variety of potential determinants of hard-copy financial report 
disclosure have been examined in the literature.  The most frequently studied include 
corporate size, size of firm’s auditors, listing status, profitability, leverage, and industry.  A 
brief review of these variables is provided below.  As noted by Ahmed and Courtis (1999), a 
wide range of theoretical arguments are employed, including agency costs, political costs, 
signalling and information asymmetry, capital needs, litigation costs, and audit firm 
reputation. 
 
As Buzby (1975, p.18) points out, “[w]hen we speak of an association between asset size and 
disclosure, we are really referring to the special characteristics surrounding the size of a firm 
and their logical link to the extent of disclosure”.  Size is a proxy for a number of corporate 
characteristics, so it is not surprising that many reasons have been advanced in the literature 
supporting an a priori expectation of an association between corporate size and disclosure.  
Singhvi and Desai (1971) and Buzby (1975) put forward three reasons.  First, larger firms 
generally have a more diverse product range and more complex distribution networks than 
smaller firms.  As a result, larger and more complex management information systems and 
databases are required for management control purposes.  Consequently, disclosure costs may 
be generally lower for larger firms.  Second, larger firms make more extensive use of capital 
markets for external financing relative to smaller firms.  It is further argued that firms can 
increase the marketability of their securities in capital markets, and obtain capital more easily 
and cheaply through more extensive disclosure.  Last, smaller firms may consider themselves 
to be placed at a competitive disadvantage relative to larger firms through more detailed 
corporate disclosure. Using agency theory, Hossain et al.(1995) argue in support of a positive 
association between size and disclosure on the basis that the potential benefits of disclosure 
increase with agency costs.  Consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs rise 
 11
with increases in the proportion of outside equity (which tends to be higher for large firms).  
Wallace and Naser (1995) argue that larger firms naturally attract a large following of 
suppliers, customers, and analysts, which consequently increases the demand for information 
about their activities.   
 
Political cost arguments have been put forward in support of both a positive association 
between firm size and disclosure (Cooke, 1989a; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 
1994), and a negative association (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Wallace et al., 1994).  Cooke 
(1989a) argues that larger companies are vulnerable to political costs, such as regulation, 
nationalisation, expropriation, or the breakup of the entity or industry (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  To counter the threat of governmental interference, companies may “... employ a 
number of devices, such as social responsibility campaigns in the media, to minimise reported 
earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979).  As part of the social responsibility campaign, firms 
might decide to increase social responsibility accounting in their corporate annual reports” 
(Cooke, 1989a, p. 178).  In contrast, both Wallace and Naser (1995) and Wallace et al. (1994) 
suggest that firms may employ an alternative strategy - one in which firms attempt to reduce 
the level of detail in their annual reports.  Empirical evidence generally supports the 
association between size and disclosure (Singhvi, 1971; Singhvi and Desai, 1971, Buzby, 
1975; Davies and Kelly, 1979; Courtis, 1979; Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992; Tai et al., 1990; Hossain et al., 1994; 
Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Marston and Robson, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), 
although there are a number of notable exceptions, e.g., Lau (1992), Malone et al. (1993), 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994); and Ahmed (1996). 
 
Stock exchange listing status (e.g., listed versus unlisted, or listed versus multiple listings) has 
been found by many researchers to be associated with disclosure (Singhvi and Desai, 1971, 
Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992, 1993; Malone et al., 1993; Hossain et al., 
1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Patton and Zelenka, 1997).  
This association largely reflects the additional information disclosures specified in the listing 
requirements of the various stock exchanges.  Additionally, Cooke (1989a) argues that agency 
costs increase as shareholders become more remote from management.  As unlisted 
companies tend to have a smaller number of shareholders, agency costs are expected to be 
lower than those for listed companies.  Conversely, due to the greater separation between 
owners and managers, listed companies are likely to incur more agency costs, such as 
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‘monitoring costs’.  These costs can be reduced through the voluntary disclosure of additional 
corporate information (Schipper, 1981).  Hossain et al. (1995) suggests that both stock 
exchange listing status and voluntary corporate disclosure are complementary forms of 
monitoring.  Consequently, one would expect to find a positive relationship between the two 
variables. 
 
Agency theory has largely been used to explain the relationship between firm leverage and 
corporate disclosure.  It is argued that as leverage increases, there are wealth transfers from 
fixed claimants to residual claimants. As debenture holders are able to ‘price-protect’ 
themselves, managers and shareholders have an incentive to voluntarily increase the level of 
monitoring, such as by increasing the disclosure of additional information about the firm 
activities (Myers, 1977; Schipper, 1981).  Empirical evidence appears to be inconclusive.  
While Courtis (1979), Lau (1992), Malone et al. (1993), Hossain et al.(1994), Hossain et 
al.(1995), Patton and Zelenka (1997) have all found a positive relationship between leverage 
and corporate disclosure, many researchers have not (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Ahmed, 1996; Inchausti, 1997). 
 
Corporate profitability has been studied by a number of researchers.  The two main measures 
of profitability used are rate of return (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; McNally et al., 1982; 
Raffournier, 1995) and earnings management (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Malone et al., 1993).  
It is argued that disclosure is used by the managers of profitable firms to assure investors of 
the firm's profitability, and to help support management's continuation and compensation 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Malone et al., 1993).  However, Wallace et al. (1994) caution that 
"… according to Lang and Lundholm (1993, pp. 248 and 251), disclosure may be related to 
variability of a firm's performance, if performance serves as a proxy for information 
asymmetries between investors and managers" and that "the empirical evidence on the 
direction of the relation between disclosure and the performance measures earnings and profit 
is not clear".  In general, the empirical findings are conflicting.  Studies have found a positive 
relationship (Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Courtis, 1979; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), 
no relationship (McNally et al., 1982; Lau, 1992), and a negative relationship (Wallace and 
Naser, 1995). 
 
Industry has been posited to be associated with disclosure.  According to Wallace and Naser 
(1995), differential levels of disclosure on similar items in financial reports published by 
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firms in different industries may arise from the adoption of industry-related disclosures.  
Differences in disclosure levels between industries could also be attributed to the high level of 
voluntary disclosure by a dominant firm within an industry which leads to a bandwagon effect 
(Cooke, 1989a).  Empirical studies have yielded mixed results.  Industry was found to be a 
determinant of disclosure levels in Courtis (1979), McNally et al. (1982), Cooke (1989a, 
1991, 1992), and Fekrat et al. (1996); whilst no relationship was found in Tai et al. (1990), 
Wallace et al. (1994), and Patton and Zelenka (1997). 
 
Lastly, size of audit firm has been included in many disclosure studies.  Both Malone et al. 
(1993) and Wallace and Naser (1995) suggest that larger audit firms are less likely to be 
pressured by clients than smaller practices due to their lower levels of fee dependence.  
Consequently, one would expect a higher level of report disclosure among the clients of larger 
audit firms.  In addition, Hossain et al. (1995) argue that large audit firms, such as the Big 5, 
have incentives not to accede to client pressure for limited disclosure due to the economic 
consequences stemming from damages to their ‘brand name’ (reputation.).  Further, Hossain 
et al. (1995) draw on signalling theory to suggest that choice of auditor can serve as a signal 
of firm value, and about the quality of a firm’s disclosures.  Empirical evidence is 
inconclusive.  The hypothesised role of the external auditor variable was confirmed by 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Raffournier (1995), Ahmed (1996), Inchausti (1997), and Patton 
and Zelenka (1997).  However, no association was found in Singhvi (1968), Firth (1979), 
McNally et al. (1982), Tai et al. (1990), Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace 
and Naser (1995), and Owusu-Ansah (1998). 
 
A summary of major disclosure studies is presented in Table 1.  As is evident from this table 
and the preceding discussion, there appear to be significant variations in the results of studies 
both within and between countries.  The mixed results are likely to reflect, among other 
things, differences in socio-economic and political environments between countries, variation 
in sample size, the differing nature and measurement of the dependent variable and 
independent variables between studies, differences in statistical methods, and sampling error 
(Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Wallace et al., 1994).  A recent meta-analysis by, Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999) attempted to tackle some of these issues by integrating prior disclosure studies, 
and identifying some of the underlying factors contributing to the observed variations in 
results.  Using 29 studies, the researchers found a significant association between disclosure 
levels and firm size, listing status, and leverage.  Further, they found that prior results were 
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moderated by differences in disclosure index construction, differences in definition of the 
explanatory variables, and differences in research setting. 
 
2.2  Internet Financial Reporting Literature 
 
The literature in relation to financial reporting on the Internet is growing.  A number of 
studies discuss the benefits of IFR, speculate on its future, and identify issues and concerns in 
relation to the use of such medium.  Some studies report on surveys of IFR practices in single 
countries while others undertake cross-country comparisons.  A few studies examine the 
corporate characteristics associated with the choice of Internet corporate financial reporting. 
 
2.2.1 Benefits, Issues, Future, and Professional Pronouncements Relating to Internet 
Financial Reporting 
 
A number of studies discuss the benefits of providing financial information on the Internet 
(e.g., McCafferty, 1995; Louwers, Pasewark and Typpo, 1996; Green and Spaul, 1997; Trites 
and Sheehy, 1997; Trites, 1999).  Cost savings from the reduction of production and 
distribution associated with paper-based annual reports and incidental requests from non-
shareholder financial statement users is one of the main benefits from providing financial 
reports on the Internet.  Internet reporting improves users' access to information by providing 
information that meet their specific needs, allowing non-sequential access to information 
through the use of hyperlinks, interactive and search facilities, and allowing the opportunity 
for providing more information than available in annual reports.  This improved accessibility 
of information results in more equitable information dissemination among stakeholders. 
 
However, the advantages of IFR give rise to a number of issues, which include blurring the 
line between audited and unaudited information, equity and efficiency of access, introduction 
of errors, security and integrity of the information, and other professional issues. 
 
Internet reporting blurs the distinction between current financial information used by 
management and the historical (and audited) information made available to the public (Green 
and Spaul, 1997).  This reporting may supersede the historically audited information currently 
made available to shareholders and the company's broader constituencies by providing 
financial information used by management (Laine, 1997).  This may place greater demands on 
auditors to provide opinion on this data (Trites and Sheehy, 1997). 
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Debreceny and Gray (1999) discuss the implications of growing IFR for external auditors. 
They identify a number of audit and auditor implications regarding the dissemination of 
audited financial statements on the Internet.  These implications include the association of the 
audit report with unaudited information and the responsibilities of auditors to monitor clients' 
websites.  Debreceny and Gray argue that if the auditing profession does not address such 
issues, the courts and government regulatory bodies will develop standards to address them. 
 
Access to information on the Internet is currently limited to those with costly equipment and 
services, and computer skills.  To ensure equity and efficiency, there is a need to make sure 
that the information provided on the Internet has been disclosed previously or simultaneously 
by using other forms of communication (McCafferty, 1995). 
 
Companies that choose to extract or re-key data from annual reports and make it accessible 
through the Internet may introduce errors, which affect the integrity of the information. 
Placing a disclaimer concerning the completeness of the information would alert the users of 
the information (Hussey and Sowinska, 1999). 
 
The security and integrity of corporate information on the Internet may be compromised 
intentionally or unintentionally.  It is the responsibility of companies to ensure the security 
and integrity of financial information they place on the Internet.  To overcome such concern, 
Hussey and Sowinska (1999) suggest that regulators should address the issue of compulsory 
filing system for financial reporting on a secure and government-controlled server. 
 
There are a number of other professional and technical issues. Providing financial information 
on the Internet may not enhance the understanding of corporate financial information. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) is developed in a traditional reporting 
environment and may not be suitable for electronic financial information environment.  Users 
may not regard Internet reporting as an acceptable substitute for hard copy annual reports. 
Companies use their websites for many purposes and therefore financial information may 
become difficult to locate. 
 
The use of the Internet for the dissemination of corporate information is a recent phenomenon 
and some studies speculate on its future.  Louwers, Pasewark and Typpo (1996) note that the 
future of online financial reporting may involve extending disclosure beyond the reproduction 
of a hard copy annual report, improving timeliness, expanding scope, and permitting a high 
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degree of interactive retrieval of information.  Timeliness is improved by providing financial 
data to the public as soon as possible by disclosing annual report data on the Internet before it 
is available in hard copy.  The future of IFR may include the use of multimedia, such as 
sound, animation and video to potentially increase the understanding of information.  Lymer 
(1999) suggests that the cost savings and the wide availability of data made possible by using 
the Internetare likely to encourage more demand for its use to fulfil statutory, as well as extra-
statutory, reporting requirements. 
 
In December 1999, the first professional pronouncement relating to IFR was released by The 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AuASB) of the Australian Accounting Research 
Foundation (AARF) in the form of an Auditing Guidance Statement (AGS 1050)  "Audit 
Issues Relating to the Electronic Presentation of Financial Reports". 
 
AGS 1050 clarifies that providing assurance about the effectiveness of the controls and 
security over information on the entity's web site is beyond the scope of the audit of a 
financial report.  The Guidance draws the auditor's attention to the practices surrounding the 
electronic presentation of information on a web site as certain characteristics in the 
presentation of electronic documents may increase the risk of inappropriate association of 
unaudited information with the audit report.  The AGS identifies specific matters which may 
be addressed by the auditor with management, to raise awareness of the risks arising and to 
assess any impact on the audit report to be presented on the entity's web site. 
 
2.2.2  Internet Reporting Practices 
 
A number of professional studies in the US, Canada, UK, Ireland and Finland examine 
corporate financial reporting on the Internet (see, for example, Petravick and Gillett, 1996; 
Flynn and Galthorpe, 1997; Koreto, 1997; Lymer, 1997; Lymer and Tallberg, 1997; 
Wildstrom, 1997; Brennan and Hourigan, 1998; Marston and Leow, 1998).  These studies 
report that increasing numbers of companies are using the Internet for communicating 
financial information.  However, these studies report little improvement in the provision of 
such information where online corporate reports consist mainly of displaying hard copies 
annual reports in an electronic format. 
 
IFR practices in many countries have have been surveyed by a number of academic studies 
(UK (Craven and Marston, 1999), Austria and Germany (Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999), 
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International Comparison (Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and Rahman, 1999), US and Canada 
(Trites, 1999), USA, UK and Germany (Deller, Stubenrath, and Weber, 1999), Sweden 
(Hedlin, 1999), Spain (Gowthorpe and Amat, 1999)).  These studies indicate the growing use 
of the Internet for corporate dissemination including providing annual reports on the Internet 
and some cross country differences. 
 
Williams and Ho (1999) compare corporate social disclosure on companies' websites and 
annual reports in Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong.  They find that Australian 
and Singaporean companies provide more corporate social disclosures on websites than in 
annual reports while companies in Malaysia and Hong Kong are reporting similar information 
in the two media.  
 
2.2.3  Characteristics Associated with Internet Financial Reporting 
 
The determinants of IFR practices have not been examined in depth.  Craven and Marston 
(1999) examine the extent of financial information disclosure on the Internet by the largest 
companies in the UK in 1998 and whether such practice is associated with firm size and 
industry type.  They find that the extent financial disclosure on the Internet is positively 
associated with firm size but not associated with industry type. 
 
Ashbaugh, Johnstone and Warfield (1999) examine the IFR practices of US companies.  They 
find that firms operating websites are larger than firms without websites.  Using univariate 
analysis, they find larger and more profitable firms, and indicators of excellence in reporting 
practices, and to some extent the percentage equity shares held by individual investors are 
associated with IFR.  However, a multivariate logit regression indicates that only firm size is 
associated with IFR.  Ashbaugh, Johnstone and Warfield suggest the development of a more 
complete model of the determinants of IFR for future research. 
 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) examine IFR practices by Austrian and German 
companies.  They find that for Austrian companies IFR is associated with firm size, measured 
by sales, and dispersion of its equity ownership.  However, such results did not extend to 
German companies. 
 
There has not been an in depth study of the determinants of IFR.  Many theories or models in 
the accounting literature such as agency/contracting, signalling and costs/benefits attempt to 
 18
explain financial reporting behaviour based on identifying the motivations for voluntary 
reporting practices.  The voluntary and growing use of the Internet as a medium for the 
dissemination of financial information provides an opportunity for an in depth examination of 
the incentives that motivate such unregulated dissemination of corporate information.  An 
understanding of voluntary reporting behaviour would be gained by assessing whether the 
determinant associated with traditional dissemination of financial information through paper-
based annual reports would explain IFR practices. 
 
Previous studies examining Internet reporting practices have relied on search engines in 
identifying study samples or populations.  This sample selection method may under-identify 
entities providing Internet financial information and may introduce sample selection bias. 
This study uses a more comprehensive approach in identifying entities engaging in IFR. 
 
 
3.  Hypotheses Development and Statement 
 
Hypothesis 1: Size and IFR 
IFR is largely unregulated, and as such, individual firm disclosure will likely reflect the trade-
off between the relevant perceived costs and benefits of supplementing traditional financial 
reporting with IFR.  Among other things, costs could include preparation and dissemination 
costs, litigation costs, or loss of competitive position; while benefits may include factors such 
as reductions in agency costs, and avoidance of political or legal costs.  Based on this fact, 
and the literature reviewed in the preceding section, the study’s formal hypotheses are 
developed in this section.  
 
For reasons mentioned earlier, agency costs tend to increase with firm size [Hossain et al., 
1995].  As voluntary disclosure can reduce monitoring costs, a significant agency cost, one 
would expect to find greater disclosure among large firms relative to small firms.  Further, as 
the cost of information production and dissemination on the Internet is likely to be largely 
unrelated to firm size [Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999], the benefits of disclosure over the 
Internet are likely to be increasing with size.  As a consequence, the first hypothesis (stated in 
alternative form) is: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between company size and the voluntary use of Internet 
financial report disclosure. 
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In this study size is measured in several different ways: market capitalisation, total assets, 
turnover, and number of employees. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Performance and IFR 
According to Lang and Lundholm [1993, p. 248 - 249], there is a common perception that 
management is more forthcoming with information “ … when the firm is performing well 
than when it is performing poorly”.  One explanation is that management is keen to raise 
shareholder confidence and support management compensation contracts [Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; Malone et al., 1993].  However, Lang and Lundholm [1993, p. 249] suggest that 
sometimes, certain types of negative information (particularly earnings information) may be 
disclosed voluntarily to reduce the likelihood of legal liability”, e.g. due to unexpectedly large 
losses.  Accordingly, we hypothesise, in alternative form, that: 
 
H2: There is a positive (negative) association between company performance and the 
voluntary use of Internet financial report disclosure. 
 
Performance is measured using one measure of growth (change in share price), several 
measures of profitability: profit before interest and tax, profit after tax, return on equity, and 
return on total assets, and two measures of efficiency: operating expenses, and operating 
expenses relative to total sales. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Liquidity and IFR 
Due to the concern that regulators, investors, and other users have with regards to companies’ 
going concern status, highly liquid companies may desire to make their levels of liquidity 
known through disclosure in their annual reports [Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998]. 
 
H3: There is a positive association between company liquidity and the voluntary use of 
Internet financial report disclosure. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Internationalisation and IFR 
The degree of internationalisation of a firm is likely to be associated with disclosure because 
as companies expand operations into foreign localities, their need to raise capital 
internationally increases accordingly [Cooke, 1991, 1992].  Companies will have an incentive 
to lower capital costs through the voluntary release of information [Choi, 1973; Owusu-
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Ansah, 1998].  Two main scenarios for internationalisation are studied in this paper: Listed 
New Zealand companies may also list on an overseas exchange, or, alternatively, 
multinational companies may have subsidiaries operating within New Zealand that are listed 
on the New Zealand Stock Exchange.   
  
H4a: There is a positive association between foreign listing status and the voluntary use of 
Internet financial report disclosure. 
 
H4b: There is a positive association between ownership status (foreign owned versus 
locally owned) and the voluntary use of Internet financial report disclosure. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Ownership spread and IFR 
According to agency theory, managers of companies whose ownership is diffuse have an 
incentive to disclose more information in order to assist shareholders in monitoring their 
behaviour [Raffournier, 1995].  In this study, diffuseness of ownership is measured by share 
spread. 
 
H5: There is a positive association between diffuseness of ownership and the voluntary use 
of Internet financial report disclosure. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Industry and IFR 
Political cost theory suggests that industry membership may affect the political vulnerability 
of firms [Inchausti, 1997; Craven and Marston, 1999].  Firms in industries which are more 
politically vulnerable may use voluntary disclosure to avoid political costs, such as regulation, 
breakup of the entity/industry, etc.  Signalling theory also suggests industry differences in 
disclosure.  If a company within an industry fails to follow the disclosure practices of others 
in the same industry, then it may be interpreted that the company is hiding bad news [Craven 
and Marston, 1999]. 
 
H6: There is an association between industry type and the voluntary use of Internet 
financial report disclosure. 
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4.  Research Design and Methodology 
 
This section describes the design and methodological highlights of the study including the 
sample description, data collection and analysis. 
 
4.1  Sample Description 
 
Two hundred and twenty-nine (229) companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZSE) as at the end of 1998 were used in this study.  Seventeen of these (eight NZ and nine 
overseas companies) were new listings.  Three approaches were used to determine the WWW 
presence or otherwise of the companies. First, two websites - The Global Register 
<http://www.globalregister.co.nz> and Knowledge Basket <http://www.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/datex/free/webs.htm>2 - were consulted to establish presence and obtain the web 
addresses of relevant companies.  Second, searches (using the www.metacrawler.com search 
engine) were carried out on the companies not hyperlinked to the above two websites.  
Finally, the outstanding companies were contacted by telephone to find out whether or not 
they have established corporate websites and if so obtain web addresses.  The multiple 
approach was considered necessary given the speed of developments with regards to website 
establishment among companies.  Table 2 presents the distribution of website- and non 
website-owning New Zealand companies by industry and overseas listing.  This approach is 
an improvement on the typical method of identifying websites through search engines. 
 
About half of NZSE’s 229 listed companies are either in Primary industries such as Mining, 
Forestry and forest products, Agriculture and Fishing or Services industries (25.3%).  Fifty-
one (22.3%) others are listed as Investment companies.  The Energy sector is the least 
represented, with only 14 (6.1%) companies. 
 
One hundred and twenty-three companies (53.7%) have websites, while the remaining 106 do 
not have websites.  The highest proportions of companies with websites are either in the 
Primary industry (32.5%) or the Services industry (27.6%).  The Property sector has the least 
proportion (6.5%).  On intra-industrial basis, the Energy sector has the highest proportion of 
corporate website with 79% of energy companies having websites.  This compares to about 71 
                                                     
2 These websites identify and provide links to the websites of NZSE-listed companies which are registered in 
New Zealand. As at December 1999, the Global Register site provided links to the websites of 14 of the 102 
companies listed thereon, while the Knowledge Basket site is linked to 69 (out of 139) company sites. 
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and 70 per cents respectively for the Goods and Primary sectors respectively.  The Investment 
and Property sectors, however, have lesser proportions of website owners compared to non-
websiters.  Less than 20 per cent (10) of Investment industry members have websites while 60 
per cent from the Services sector do not have websites. 
 
About one-third (32.3%) of the companies are overseas-listed. Of these, about 60 per cent 
(44) have websites, as compared to 51 per cent (79) of companies not listed overseas, 
suggesting overseas listing as a potential factor affecting companies’ decision to create 
websites. 
 
4.2  Data Collection and Description 
 
Data for this study were collected mainly from the WWW.  By browsing through the websites 
of companies in our sample, it was established whether they provide Internet Financial 
Reports or not.  The financial data on size, profitability, efficiency, liquidity, etc were then 
downloaded from their annual reports or highlights.  In addition, the Datex database was 
accessed to obtain data for the remaining companies, particularly those without websites. 
Where these two sources fail to yield the required dataset, hard copies of the company's 
annual reports and accounts were consulted.  Finally, various editions of The New Zealand 
Business Who's Who (1996-1998) directory were consulted to obtain additional descriptive 
details such as the location of ownership and number of employees.  Details of the primary 
data variables collected are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
5.  Data Analysis 
 
This study aims to identify the determinants of IFR among NZSE-listed companies.  To 
achieve these aims, both univariate and multivariate analytical approaches are employed in 
the study.  First, comprehensive exploratory data analysis is carried out to determine the latent 
tendencies of the collected data.  The 229 companies in the dataset are categorised into 
companies with websites (websiters) and companies without websites (non-websiters) (see 
Table 2).  The group of 123 websiters are then divided into two sub-groups, companies 
providing financial reports on the Internet (IFRC) and companies not providing financial 
reports on the Internet (N-IFRC).  Descriptive statistics on grouped and sub-grouped 
companies are presented in Table 4. 
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Secondly, univariate independent sample t-tests were carried out on relevant variables for the 
four sub-groups of companies.  The test allows us to test for possible differences in the mean 
of the selected variables between IFRC and N-IFRC.  The results of the test are presented in 
Table 5. 
 
Finally, multivariate logit regressions were employed to explore the impact of each of the 
variables on IFR practices.  For this investigation, the dependent variable is classified as a 
binary choice between IFRC and N-IFRC.  Logit analyses enable us to investigate the 
probability of an event's occurrence in relation to a number of measurable independent 
variables such as size, performance, efficiency, etc., with the estimation allowing us to 
compare the relative importance of these variables. 
 
An algebraic statement of the estimated model is as follows: 
 
 Υ i = α + Χ∑ ij β  + μ i   (1) 
   
where, for the ith company 
 
 Υ  = the dependant variable (1 IFR; 0 for N-IFR) 
 α = the equation's intercept 
 Xj = the measure of the exploratory variable j 
 β  = estimate of the coefficient of the exploratory variable 
 μ  = stochastic disturbance term 
 
In its full form with respect to this paper, the equation is: 
 
Υ i =  α  +  β1  (Size)i  +   β2  (Sector)i + β3  (Profitability)i    +   β4  (Efficiency)i    
   +    β5  (Liquidity)i    +  β6 (Growth)i     +    β7  (Ownership Spread)i   
+    β8  (Internationalisation)i    +    μi  (2) 
 
Where, for the  i th  firm,  
  
Υ   = IFR practice; 0 for N-IFRC and 1 for IFRC 
α       = the constant of the equation 
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Size      = measure of size 
Profitability     = measure of profitability 
Efficiency  = operating expenses to sales 
Sector   = industrial sector 
Liquidity  = cash assets by total assets 
Growth   = growth in share 
Ownership spread   = proportion of shares held by top 40% shareholders 
Internationalisation  = overseas listing or control 
μ   = error term 
 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
5.1.1  Websiters versus Non-Websiters 
 
Preliminary statistics, as represented in Table 4 indicate that, generally, websiters are larger 
than non-websiters.  This holds across all size indicators (market capitalisation, total assets, 
turnover and number of employees) measured in this study.  The mean market value of 
websiters, for example was about $8,000 million (total assets = $2,489 million) compared to 
non-websiters’ market value of about $70 million (total assets = $152 million); while their 
average number of employees was more than 3.5 times greater than those of non-websiters. 
This result is similar to that reported by Ashbaugh et al. (1999) that the size of US websiters 
(as measured by their total assets) is, on average, more than double those of non-websiters. 
 
This trend is repeated for the performance (profitability and efficiency) of the two groups of 
companies.  Websiters, on average, are more profitable.  They returned average profit figures 
(profit before interest and tax and profit after tax) which are substantially greater than those of 
non-websiters between 1996 and 1998.  This position of higher profitability holds even when 
projects are scaled down by some measures of size (return on equity and return on total asset). 
Incidentally, websiters incurred higher mean operating expenses as well, reinforcing a notion 
that companies that create websites are “big spending-high profiteers”.  It would appear 
though that their “big-spending” are “small” in relative terms, given that their operating 
expenses to sales of 0.99% is less than that of non-websiters (1.65%), indicating higher level 
of efficiency on their (websiters') part.  The combination of higher profits and lower OEXS 
has resulted in a higher rate of growth in the market value of websiters, which is double that 
of non-websiters. 
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5.1.2  IFRC versus N-IFRC 
 
A similar comparison between IFR and N-IFR reveal that companies that engage in IFR are 
generally larger and more profitable than non-IFR ones.  Their average market value of 
$11,421 million is far greater than that of N-IFR (only $375 million).  The same applies to all 
the other measures of size used in this study. 
 
Performance-wise, IFR companies returned greater levels of profit across both single and 
size-denominated variables.  These were substantial enough to result in higher level of growth 
in share value for IFR companies between 1996 and 1998. With regards to efficiency, 
however, IFRCs incurred a comparatively higher level of expenditure, the magnitude of 
which is further revealed when their operating expenses are denominated by sales.  IFRCs 
appear to be more liquid while a greater proportion (82%) of N-IFRCs' shares are held by 
their top 40% shareholders, indicating greater spread among IFRCs. 
 
 
6.  Results and Discussion 
 
6.1  Univariate Data Analysis 
 
Univariate statistical analysis is used to investigate the level of significance of the observed 
differences in size, profitability, efficiency, liquidity and ownership spread.  The results of the 
tests as presented in Table 5, support H1 in that differences in size are statistically significant 
across most of the variables.  Differences in market capitalisation was significant at the 1% 
level while those of total asset and turnover were at the 5% level.  Differences in the number 
of employees is significant at 10% level. 
 
Similarly, there are statistically significant differences in the performance of the two groups 
of companies.  This is highly pronounced in their profit before interest and tax, and profit 
after tax which are all significant at the 1% level. In all cases, IFR companies reported greater 
level of profitability.  Efficiency-wise, differences in OEXS was found to be statistically 
significant, with IFR companies being more efficient than their non-IFR companies.  This, 
however, was not replicated for differences in growth in market value, which was not 
statistically significant at the 10% level or higher.  The latter result is consistent with the only 
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other New Zealand study to investigate the effects of growth [McNally et al., 1982].  In 
general, univariate tests appear to provide support for H2.  
 
Liquidity appears not to be an issue when the two groups are compared as no statistically 
significant differences were found in the companies end of year cash asset balances.  On this 
basis, H3 is not supported.  With respect to ownership spread, websiters’ shareholding base 
appear to be more dispersed as they have greater number of shareholders and a lower 
percentage of these is retained in the hands of their top 40% of shareholders.  The difference 
between the two groups is significant at the 1% level and is thus consistent with H5. 
 
Although not reported, H4a (foreign listing status), H4b (foreign ownership), and H6 (industry) 
were tested using Chi-square tests.  Both foreign listing status (H4a) and foreign ownership 
(H4b) were statistically significant (p<0.05 and p<0.000, respectively), while industry (H6) 
was not significant. 
 
On the univariate level, on average, IFR listed companies are larger, more efficient and more 
profitable with a more widely dispersed shareholding base.  This paper further investigates 
whether the IF reporting practices of these companies can be predicted from a combination of 
these variables.  A multivariate logistic regression analysis is employed for this purpose. 
 
6.2  Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
Two models, A and B, incorporating different independent variables as measures of size, 
profitability and foreign listing/ownership, were specified and used to investigate the 
determinants of IFR among the listed companies.  The general model, as earlier specified in 
equation (2) states that:  
  
Υ i =  α  +  β1  (Size) i  +   β2  (Profitability) i    +   β3  (Efficiency) i     +    β4 (Sector) i  
   +    β5  (Liquidity) i    +  β6 (Growth) i     +    β7  (Ownership Spread) i   
+    β8  (Internationalisation) i    +    μi  (2) 
 
Where, for the  i th  firm in Model A,  
  
Υ   =   IFR practice; O for Non IF reporters and 1 for IF reporters 
α       =    The constant of the equation 
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Size      =    log of market capitalisation 
Profitability     =     Return on equity 
Efficiency      =    Operating expenses to sales 
Sector     =     Industrial sector 
Liquidity     = Cash assets by total assets 
Growth      = Growth in market value 
Ownership spread    =   Proportion of shares held by top 40% shareholders 
Internationalisation  =   Overseas listing 
μ   = error term 
 
The exploratory variables used in Model B are identical to those of Model A above except for 
the following: 
 
 Size     =   log of total assets 
 Profitability     =   Earnings per share 
 Internationalisation  =   Foreign control 
 
The results of the estimate of Model A for all 123 websites is reported under A1 in Table 5. 
Cook’s Distance test is used to explore potential outlying or misclassified cases.  The results 
indicate that three outlying cases were exercising undue influence on the residuals resulting 
from the estimation of Model A1.  These cases were removed and the model is re-estimated 
with the smaller sample of 120 companies.  The results of this estimation are presented as A2 
in Table 6. 
 
Model A1, which accurately classifies more than 75% of the observations in this study is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The results of its estimation indicate that NZSE-listed 
companies’ IFR practices are highly dependent on size, ownership spread and efficiency 
thereby supporting H1, H5, and giving weak support only to H2.  Size is a statistically 
significant predictor at the 1% level, while spread of shareholding and efficiency are 
significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
The rate of correctly predicted observations is improved after the three outliers were removed 
(Model A2 = 78%).  The model is also significant at the 1% level.  It’s results are broadly 
similar to those of Model A1, the main exception being the coefficient of Industrial Sector, 
which is now significant at the 5% level thereby providing some support for H6. 
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Model B1 was estimated using alternative variables for size, profitability, and foreign 
listing/affiliation.  The results confirm the findings in the earlier models that size and level of 
efficiency are positively related to IFR practices.  High concentration of shares in the hands of 
the top 40% of shareholders, as in previous models, is also negatively related to IFR.  These 
results are consistent with H1, H4, and H6.  Again, weak evidence is presented for H2. 
 
Similar to the procedure applied to Model A1 above, Cook’s Distance test revealed that three 
of the cases in the study exerted disproportionate influence on the coefficients that resulted 
from Model B1’s estimation. Model B2 is a re-estimation of B1 excluding the three outlying 
cases.  It resulted in the highest level of correct classification of the cases in this study.  The 
results again confirm the influence of size, efficiency and shareholding spread on listed 
companies’ IFR practices.  In addition, foreign affiliation was revealed to be a significant 
predictor of IFR practice at the 1% level, supporting H4. 
 
Across the four models estimated in this study, size is shown to have a significant and positive 
impact on IFR practice.  Larger firms are more likely to engage in IFR.  This finding is 
consistent with those reported by Ashbaugh et al. (1999) on IFR practices of US firms.  It is 
also in line with the findings of a number of studies on hard copy-based corporate disclosure 
(McNally et al., 1982; Hossain et al., 1995; Wallace and Nasar, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  
It appears that larger companies are able to derive scale benefits from incremental voluntary 
disclosure and are less likely to be competitively disadvantaged by such incremental 
disclosures. 
 
Higher level of shareholding by the top 40% of shareholders was consistently negatively 
related to IFR practices in all four models.  The combination of the finding relating to size 
with that of ownership spread is interesting.  IFR companies are not only large, but their 
shareholding is more widely dispersed rather than concentrated in a few hands.  Incremental 
voluntary disclosure through the web could be viewed as an additional channel of 
communication set up by IFR to reach their more widely dispersed owners. 
 
Although relatively weak in all the four models, the finding that efficiency is statistically 
significant (at the 10% level) and positively related to IFR practice could indicate that 
incremental voluntary disclosure is not necessarily wasteful.  IFR companies are significantly 
more efficient in comparison to their non IFR counterparts.  The significance of this finding is 
increased given that large firms are not usually associated with higher levels of efficiency. 
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IFR companies in this study are able to benefit from scale efficiencies which significantly 
over-compensated for their apparent higher level of operating expenditure. 
 
The statistically significant residuals returned by industrial sector and foreign affiliations in 
Models A2 and B2 respectively provide additional insight into the factors that determine 
NZSE-listed companies’ IFR practices.  Cross-industrial differences in disclosure 
requirements have been reported to influence conventional disclosure practices (see Owusu-
Ansah, 1998).  How this is transferable to IFR is not immediately clear aside from the 
possibility industries that operate closer to the end-user such as Services are more likely to be 
prone to use the web to reach out to the outside world more than primary industries such as 
Agriculture and Fishing.  Whether this is transferable to investor relations or not is open to 
conjecture. The weak relationship revealed in this study is expected to dissipate in the near 
future as a convergence of interest in the WWW is achieved across industries.  The 
relationship between foreign affiliations and IFR could indicate that the reporting 
environments of their foreign affiliates influence New Zealand companies reporting practices. 
It could also indicate that New Zealand companies with foreign affiliates have global 
stakeholders who are served by reporting on the Internet, a medium which enhances 
international access for information. 
 
To summarise, multivariate analysis supports H1 (size) and H5 (diffusion of ownership).  Only 
weak evidence consistent with H2 (performance) is found. 
 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
The development of the Internet as a medium for corporate communication creates news ways 
for the dissemination of corporate financial information.  The paper reports on the website 
practices of NZSE-listed companies and the determinants of IFR practices among these 
companies.  A significant number of the companies have set up websites and some of them 
engage in IFR.  The results of the study indicate that firm size, efficiency and the spread of 
ownership motivates the provision of IFR.  The larger a company is, the more likely it is to set 
up a website and to use it for IFR. This finding suggests that large firms are deriving benefits 
from setting up websites and engaging in IFR.  The results indicate that the ratio of operating 
expenses to sales (a measure of efficiency) is a significant predictor of IFR practices.  IFR 
companies are significantly more efficient and could be clearly distinguished from non-IFR 
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companies.  The higher the proportion of shareholding, by the bottom 60% of shareholders, 
the greater the probability a NZ company provides financial information on the internet.  It 
was surprising to find no significant relationship between profitability and IFR..  Similarly, 
the level of liquidity is not significantly related to IFR practices.  This is another unexpected 
result, given the costs incurred in the development of web presence. 
 
Future research may consider other explanatory variables that are not incorporated in the 
current study which may provide further insights into NZ firms’ IFR practices.  The suggested 
factors are unique to the reporting culture created by the Internet.  They include factors such 
as the age and levels of education of company directors/key decision makers, attitude of 
management to IT and new ideas, the age and strategic position of each company in its 
industry, the stage in the life cycle of the company’s major products, etc.  These factors may 
influence voluntary IFR practice.  Our study is based on NZ practices; practices in other 
countries and international comparisons of determinants of IFR are useful in the development 
of a comprehensive predictive model for the choice of IFR. 
 31
References 
 
Ahmed, K. (1996) Disclosure Policy Choice and Corporate Characteristics: A Study of 
Bangladesh, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting June, 183-200. 
 
Ahmed, K. and J. K. Courtis (1999) Associations Between Corporate Characteristics and 
Disclosure Levels in Annual Reports: A Meta-Analysis, British Accounting Review 
31, 35-61. 
 
Ahmed, K., and D. Nicholls (1994) The Impact of Non-Financial Company Characteristics on 
Mandatory Disclosure Compliance in Developing Countries: The Case of Bangladesh, 
The International Journal of Accounting 29, 62-77. 
 
Ashbaugh, H., Johnstone, K. and T. Warfield. Corporate Reporting on the Internet, 
Accounting Horizons, September, 241-257. 
 
Brennan, N. and D. Hourigan (1998) Corporate Reporting on the Internet by Irish Companies, 
Accountancy Ireland December, 18-21. 
 
Buzby, S. L. (1975) Company Size, Listed Versus Unlisted Stocks, and the Extent of 
Financial Disclosure, Journal of Accounting Research 13(1), Spring, 16 - 37. 
 
Cerf, A. R. (1961) Corporate Reporting and Investment Decisions, (University of California, 
Berkley). 
 
Choi, F. (1973) Financial Disclosure and Entry to the European Capital Market, Journal of 
Accounting Research 11, Autumn, 159–175. 
 
Chow, C., and A. Wong-Boren (1987) Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Mexican 
Corporation, The Accounting Review July, 533-541. 
 
Cooke, T. (1989a) Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish Companies, Journal of 
International Financial Management & Accounting, 1(2), 171 - 195. 
 
Cooke, T. (1989b) Disclosure in the Corporate Annual Reports of Swedish Companies,  
Accounting and Business Research 19(74), 113-124. 
 
Cooke, T. (1991) An Assessment of Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports of Japanese 
Corporations, The International Journal of Accounting 26, 174-189. 
 
Cooke, T. (1992) The Impact of Size, Stock Market Listing and Industry Type on Disclosure 
in the Annual Reports of Japanese Listed Corporations, Accounting and Business 
Research 22(7), 229-237. 
 
Cooke, T.(1993) Disclosure in Japanese Corporate Annual Reports, Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting June, 521-535. 
 
Courtis, J. K. (1979) Annual Report Disclosure in New Zealand: Analysis of Selected 
Corporate Attributes, Research Study No. 8, (Unversity of New England, Armidale,). 
  
 32
Craven, B. and C. Marston (1999) Financial reporting on the Internet by leading UK 
companies, The European Accounting Review 8(2), 321-333. 
 
Davies, R. and G. Kelly (1979) The Quality of Annual Report Disclosure in Australia and its 
Relationship to Corporate Size, Management Forum, 4,5, December, 259-273. 
 
Debreceny, R. and G. Gray (1999) Financial reporting on the Internet and the external audit, 
The European Accounting Review 8(2), 335-350. 
 
Deller, D., M. Stubenrath, and C. Weber (1999) A survey on the use of the Internet for 
investor relations in the USA, the UK and Germany, The European Accounting 
Review 8(2), 351-364. 
 
Fekrat, M., C. Inclan and D. Petroni (1996) Corporate Environmental Disclosures: 
Competitive Disclosure Hypothesis Using Annual Report Data, The International 
Journal of Accounting 31(2), 175-195. 
 
Firth, M. (1979) The Impact of Size, Stock Market Listing, and Auditors on Voluntary 
Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports, Accounting and Business Research 9(36), 
273-280.  
 
Fisher, R.; Laswad, F.; and P. Oyelere (1999) Online Electronic Financial Reporting: 
Practices and Issues, Commerce Division Discussion Paper No. 76, Lincoln 
University. 
 
Flynn, G. and C. Galthorpe (1997) Volunteering Financial Data on the World Wide Web: A 
Study of Financial Reporting from a Stakeholder Perspective, First Financial 
Reporting and Business Communication Conference, Cardiff. 
 
Forker, J. (1992) Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality, Accounting and Business 
Research 22(86), 111-124. 
 
Foster, G. (1986) Financial Statement Analysis, Second edition, (Prentice-Hall,Englewood 
Cliff, NJ). 
 
Gowthorpe, C. and O. Amat (1999) External reporting of accounting and financial 
information via the Internet in Spain, The European Accounting Review 8(2), 365-371. 
 
Green, G. and B. Spaul (1997) Digital Accountability, Accountancy, International Edition, 
May, 49-50. 
 
Hedlin, P. (1999) The Internet as a vehicle for investor relations: the Swedish case, The 
European Accounting Review 8(2), 373-381. 
 
Hossain, M., M. H. B. Perera and A. R. Rahman (1995) Voluntary Disclosure in Annual 
Reports of New Zealand Companies, Journal of International Financial Management 
and Accounting 6(1), 69 - 85. 
 
Hossain, M., M. Lin and M. Adams (1994) Voluntary Disclosure in an Emerging Capital 
Market: Some Empirical Evidence from Companies Listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange, The International Journal of Accounting 29, 334-351. 
 
 33
Hussey, R. and M. Sowinska (1999) The risks of financial reports on the Internet, Accounting 
and Business, March 18-19. 
 
Inchausti, B.G. (1997) The Influence of Company Characteristics and Accounting Regulation 
on Information Disclosed by Spanish Firms, The European Accounting Review, 6(1), 
45-68. 
 
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1978) Can the Corporation Survive?, Financial Analysts 
Journal 34(1), 31-37. 
 
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(3), October, 305-
360. 
 
Koreto, R.J. (1997) When the Bottom Line is Online, Journal of Accountancy, March, 63-65. 
 
Laine, C. (1997) Get Better acquainted with the Internet, Accountancy, International Edition, 
October p96. 
 
Lang, M. and R. Lundholm (1993) Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of 
Corporate Disclosures, Journal of Accounting Research 31(2), 246–271. 
 
Lau, A. (1992) Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Hong Kong Listed Companies, Hong Kong 
Manager, May/June, 10-19. 
 
Leftwich, R. W., R. L. Watts, and J. L. Zimmerman (1981) Voluntary Corporate Disclosure: 
The Case of Interim Reporting, Journal of Accounting Research 19, Supplement, 50-
77. 
 
Louwers, T., Pasewark, W. and E. Typpo (1998) Silicon Valley Meets Norwalk, Journal of 
Accountancy, August, 20-24. 
 
Lymer, A. and A. Tallberg (1997) Corporate Reporting and the Internet - A Survey and 
Commentary on the Use of the WWW in Corporate Reporting in the UK and Finland, 
Paper presented at the Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association 
Graz, Austria.  
 
Lymer, A. (1999) The Internet and the future of corporate reporting in Europe, The European 
Accounting Review 8(2), 289-301. 
 
Lymer, A., Debreceny, R., Gray, G. and A. Rahman (1999) Business Reporting on the 
Internet, International Accounting Standards Committee, November. 
 
Lymer, A. (1997) Corporate Reporting via the Internet - A Survey of Current Usage in the 
UK and Discussion of Issues, First Financial Reporting and Business Communication 
Conference, Cardiff. 
 
Malone, D., C. Fries and T. Jones (1993) An Empirical Investigation of the Extent of 
Corporate Financial Disclosure in the Oil and Gas Industry, Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance, 8(3), 249-273.  
 
 34
Marston, C. and C.Y. Leow (1998) Financial Reporting on the Internet by leading UK 
companies, Paper presented at the 21st Annual Congress of the European Accounting 
Association, Antwerp, Belgium.  
 
Marston, C. L., and P. J. Shrives (1991) The Use of Disclosure Indices in Accounting 
Research: A Review Article, British Accounting Review 25, 195-210. 
 
Marston, C. L., and P. Robson (1997) Financial Reporting in India: Changes in Disclosure 
over the Period 1982 – 1990, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting 4(1), June, 109-139. 
 
McCafferty, J. (1995) Investor Relations, How Much to Reveal online, CFO, December p12. 
 
McNally, G. M., H. E. Lee and R. Hasseldine (1982) Corporate Financial Reporting in New 
Zealand: An analysis of User Preferences, Corporate Characteristics and Disclosure 
Practices for Discretionary Information, Accounting and Business Research 13, 
Winter, 11-20. 
 
Messenger, J C. (1999) Document Delivery on the Web, Inform, February. 
 
Myers, S. C. (1977) Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 
5(1), 147-175. 
 
New Zealand Financial Press (1996-1998) The New Zealand Business Who's Who: A 
Directory of Leading Business Houses of New Zealand, 37th, 38th and 39th editions, 
(New Zealand Financial Press Ltd Auckland). 
 
Owusu-Ansah, S. (1998) The Impact of Corporate Attributes on the Extent of Mandatory 
Disclosure and Reporting by Listed Companies in Zimbabwe, The International 
Journal of Accounting, 33(5), 605-631. 
 
Patton, J. and I. Zelenka (1997) An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of the Extent of 
Disclosure in Annual Reports of Joint Stock Companies in the Czech Republic, The 
European Accounting Review 6(4), 605-626. 
 
Petravick, S. and J. Gillett (1996) Financial Reporting on the World Wide Web, Management 
Accounting, July, 26-29. 
 
Pirchegger, B. and A. Wagenhofer (1999) Financial information on the Internet: a survey of 
the homepages of Austrian companies, The European Accounting Review 8(2), 383-
395. 
 
Raffournier, B. (1995) The Determinants of Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Swiss Listed 
Companies, The European Accounting Review 4(2), 261-280. 
 
Schipper, K. (1981) Discussion of Voluntary corporate Disclosure.  The Case of Interim 
Reporting, Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, 19, 85-88. 
 
Singhvi, S. S. and H. B. Desai (1971) An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate 
Financial Disclosure, The Accounting Review, 46(1), 120-138. 
 
Singhvi, S. S. (1968) Characteristics and Implications of Inadequate Disclosure: A Case Study 
of India, The International Journal of Accounting Education and Research, 3(2), 29-43. 
 35
Tai, B., P. Au-Yeung, M. Kwok and L. Lau (1990) Non-Compliance with Disclosure 
Requirements in Financial Statements: the Case of Hong Kong Companies, The 
International Journal of Accounting 25, 99-112. 
 
Thomas, A. (1986) The Contingency Theory of corporate Reporting: Some Empirical 
Evidence, Accounting, Organisations and Society 11(3), 253 -270. 
 
Trites, G. (1999) The Impact of Technology on Financial and Business Reporting, Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
 
Trites, G. and D. Sheehy (1997) Electronic disclosure making a hit on the net, CA Magazine, 
March p10. 
 
Wallace, R. S. O. and K. Naser (1995) Firm Specific Determinants of Comprehensiveness of 
Mandatory Disclsoure in the Corporate Annual Reports of Firms on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 14, 311-368. 
 
Wallace, R. S. O., K. Naser, and A. Mora (1994) The Relationship Between 
Comprehensiveness of Corporate Annual Reports and Firm Characteristics in Spain, 
Accounting and Business Research 25(97), 41-53. 
 
Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman (1979) The Demand For and Supply of Accounting 
Theories: The Market for Excuses, The Accounting Review, 54, April, 273-305. 
 
Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman (1986) Positive Accounting Theory (Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ). 
  
Watts, R. L. (1977) Corporate Financial Statements, a Product of the Market and Political 
Process, Australian Journal of Management  2, April, 53-75. 
 
Wildstrom, S. H. (1997) Surfing For Annual Reports, Business Week, April, p. 10. 
 
Williams, S. and C. Ho (1999) Corporate social disclosures by listed companies on their web 
sites: an international comparison, The International Journal of Accounting, 34(3), 
389-419. 
 36
Table 1 
Description of Disclosure Studies 
 
Hypothesised Independent Variables* 
 
Author(s) 
 
Country 
No. 
of 
Firms 
Dependent 
Variable 
(Disclosure 
index) 
Type of 
Analysis Significant influence (p<0.1) Not significant 
       
Davies & Kelly (1979) Australia 50 Aggregate Univariate Size (REP)  
       
Ahmed & Nicholls (1994) Bangladesh 63 Mandatory Mulivariate Auditor size 
Foreign parent 
Qualif. of principal acctg. officer 
Leverage (BVD) 
Size (TA, S) 
       
Ahmed (1996) Bangladesh 118 Aggregate Multivariate Auditor size 
Foreign parent 
Size (TA, S) 
Leverage (BVD) 
       
Patton & Zelenka (1997) Czech Repub. 50 Mandatory Univariate Auditor size 
Leverage (BVD/TA) 
Listing status (UvL) 
No. of employees 
Size (TA) 
Industry 
Profitability (RR) 
Risk (INTG) 
    Multivariate Auditor size 
Listing status (UvL) 
No. of employees 
Profitability (RR) 
Industry 
Leverage (BVD/TA) 
Risk (INTG) 
Size (TA) 
       
Lau (1992) Hong Kong 26 Voluntary Multivariate Leverage (BVD/SHF) Profitability (RR) 
Size (TA) 
       
Tai et al. (1990) Hong Kong 76 Mandatory Univariate Size (SHF) Auditor size 
Industry 
       
Wallace & Naser (1995) Hong Kong 80 Aggregate Multivariate Size (TA, S) 
Diversification 
Auditor size 
Leverage (BVLTD/SHF) 
Liquidity 
Location of reg. office 
Ownership structure (PUB) 
Profitability (RR, EM) 
Size (MVE) 
Marston & Robson (1997) India 58 Aggregate Univariate Size (S)  
       
Singhvi (1968) India 45 Aggregate Univariate Ownership Structure (SH) 
Profitability (RR)  
Size (TA)  
Type of Management 
Auditor size 
Profitability (EM) 
       
Cooke (1991) Japan 48 Voluntary Multivariate Industry 
Listing status (UvLvML) 
Size (TA, S, SH) 
 
       
Cooke (1992) Japan 35 Aggregate Multivariate Industry 
Listing status (LvML) 
Size (FACT) 
 
       
Cooke (1993) Japan 48 Aggregate Univariate Listing status (LvML, UvML) Listing status (UvL) 
       
Hossain et al. (1994) Malaysia 67 Voluntary Univariate Auditor size 
Leverage (BVLTD/SHF) 
Listing status (LvML) 
Ownership structure (TOP10) 
Size (MVE) 
Assets in place 
    Multivariate Listing status (LvML) 
Ownership structure (TOP10) 
Size (MVE) 
Assets in place 
Auditor size 
Leverage (BVLTD/SHF) 
       
Chow & Wong-Boren (1987) Mexico 52 Voluntary Multivariate Size (MVE + BVD) Assets in place 
Leverage (BVD/Size) 
       
Fekrat et al. (1996) Multinational 168 Aggregate Univariate Country 
Industry 
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Table 1 (Continued): Description of disclosure studies 
Hypothesised Independent Variables* 
 
Author(s) 
 
Country 
No. 
of 
Firms 
Dependent 
Variable 
(Disclosure 
index) 
Type of 
Analysis Significant influence (p<0.1) Not significant 
       
Courtis (1979) New Zealand 126 Aggregate Univariate Capital market access 
Industry 
Leverage (DISS,  EE) 
Ownership Structure (SH) 
Profitability (RR, EM, ANI) 
Report resource alloc. (PC, PT, PG) 
Size (TA, S, SHF, EMP, DIR, SUB) 
Age 
Auditor size 
Profitability (DR, DP) 
Report timeliness 
 
 
       
Hossain et al. (1995) New Zealand 55 Voluntary Multivariate Leverage (BVLTD/SHF) 
Listing status (LvML) 
Size (TA) 
Assets in place 
Auditor size 
       
McNally et al. (1982) New Zealand 103 Voluntary Univariate Industry 
Size (TA) 
Auditor size 
Growth (TA) 
Profitability (RR) 
       
Inchausti (1997) Spain 138 Aggregate Multivariate Auditor size 
Listing status 
Size (TA) 
Dividend pay-out ratio 
Profitability (EM) 
Leverage (BVD/SHF) 
Size (S) 
       
Wallace et al. (1994) Spain 50 Mandatory Multivariate Liquidity 
Listing status (LvU) 
Size (TA, S) 
Auditor size 
Industry 
Leverage (BVD/SHF) 
Profitability (RR, EM)  
       
Cooke (1989a) Sweden 90 Aggregate Multivariate Industry 
Listing status (UvLvML) 
Size (TA, S, SH) 
 
       
Cooke (1989b) Sweden 90 Voluntary Multivariate Listing status (UvLvML) 
Size (TA, S, SH) 
 
       
Raffournier (1995) Switzerland 161 Voluntary Univariate Assets in place 
Auditor size 
Industry 
Internationality 
Profitability (RR) 
Size (S) 
Leverage (BVD/TA) 
Ownership structure (USH) 
Size (TA) 
     Auditor size 
Internationality 
Profitability (RR) 
Size (S) 
Assets in Place 
Industry 
Leverage (BVD/TA) 
Ownership structure (USH) 
Size (TA) 
       
Firth (1979) UK 180 Voluntary Univariate Listing status (UvL) 
Size (S, CE) 
Auditor size 
       
Buzby (1975) USA 88 Aggregate Univariate Size (TA) Listing status (UvL) 
       
Malone et al. (1993) USA 125 Aggregate Multivariate Leverage (BVD/SHF) 
Listing status (UvL) 
Ownership Structure (SH) 
Auditor size 
Diversification 
Foreign operations 
Profitability (RR, EM) 
Proptn. of outside directors 
Size (TA) 
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Table 1 (Continued): Description of disclosure studies 
Hypothesised Independent Variables* 
 
Author(s) 
 
Country 
No. 
of 
Firms 
Dependent 
Variable 
(Disclosure 
index) 
Type of 
Analysis Significant influence (p<0.1) Not significant 
       
Singhvi & Desai (1971) USA 155 Aggregate Univariate 
 
Auditor size 
Listing status (UvL) 
Ownership Structure (SH) 
Profitability (RR, EM) 
Size (TA) 
 
    Multivariate Listing status (UvL) 
Profitability (EM) 
Auditor size 
Ownership Structure (SH) 
Size (TA) 
       
Owusu-Ansah (1998) Zimbabwe 49 Mandatory Multivariate Age 
Foreign parent 
Ownership structure (1-PUB) 
Profitability (RR) 
Size (TA) 
Auditor size 
Liquidity 
 
* ANI = Absolute net income; BVD = Book value of debt; BVLTD = Book value of long term debt; CE = Capital employed; DIR = Number of directors; DISS = 
Public issues of long term debt; DP = Dividend pay-out ratio; DR = Dividend rate; EE = Percent external equities; EM = Earnings Management; EMP = Number of 
employees; FACT = Composite variable comprising eight variables; INTG = Proportion of intangible assets to total assets; L = Listed; ML = Multilisted; PC = 
Preparation cost; PG = Pages; PUB = Proportion of shares owned by the public; PT = Preparation time; MVE = Market value of equity; S = Sales; SH = Number of 
shareholders; SHF = Shareholders' funds; SUB = Number of subsidiaries; RR = Rate of Return; REP = Report Recipients; TA = Total assets; TOP10 = Proportion of 
shares owned by top 10 shareholders; U = Unlisted; USH = Proportion of shares owned by ‘unknown’ shareholders. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Website- and Non website-owning Companies by Industry and Overseas listing 
 
Industrial Sector (NZ) Total No Website Yes Website 
 Count %* Count %* Count %* (of industry total) 
Primary (G01) 58 25.3 18 17.0 40 32.5 (70) 
Energy (G02) 14 6.1 3 2.8 11 8.9 (79) 
Goods (G03) 28 12.2 8 7.5 20 16.3 (71) 
Property (G04) 20 8.7 12 11.3 8 6.5 (40) 
Services (G05) 58 25.3 24 22.6 34 27.6 (59) 
Investment (G06) 51 22.3 41 38.7 10 8.1 (20) 
Total 229 100.0 106 100.0 123 100.0 (n/a) 
 
Overseas-Listing status 
 Count %* Count %* Count %* (of listed? total) 
Not listed overseas 155 67.7 76 71.7 79 64.2 (51) 
Listed overseas 74 32.3 30 28.3 44 35.8 (60) 
Total 229 100.0 106 100.0 123 100.0 
* Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding 
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Table 3 
Research Variables 
 
Variables Research code Definition* 
Size   
Market capitalisation MCAP Market value of companies as measured by their 
total capitalisation as at the end of 1998 
Total assets TASS Average total assets 
Turnover SALE Average net turnover 
Number of employees NEMP Average number of full time equivalent 
employees 
   
Profitability   
Growth GRWT Growth in firm value as measured by the 
difference increase in share price between 1996 
and 1998 
Profit before interest and tax PBIT Average net profit for the year before interest and 
tax 
Profit after tax PATX Average net profit for the year after tax but 
before after-tax items and dividends. 
Return on equity ROEQ Profit after tax x 100 
Shareholder equity 
Return on total asset ROTA Profit after tax x 100 
Total assets 
Efficiency   
Operating expenses OPEX Average total operating expenses 
Operating expenses to sales OEXS Operating expenses x 100 
Sales (to 3rd parties only) 
   
Liquidity   
Cash Assets LIQD Average ending balance of cash and similar 
items 
Cash assets by total assets LQTS Cash and similar items 
Total assets 
   
Others   
Overseas listing? OLST Establishing whether or not a company is listed 
overseas in addition to the availability of its 
securities on the NZSE 
Website? SITE Establishing whether or not a company has got a 
website 
Financial Information? FINF Identifying websiters with financial information 
on their sites, that is, IF reporters 
Type of financial information TYPE Financial highlights, financial statements or both 
Presentation format of financial 
information 
PRST HTML, pdf, both or other formats 
Industrial sector SECT Main industrial group sector 
Location of control OWNS Foreign or New Zealand-controlled company 
Share spread SPRD The proportion of shares owned by the top 40% 
of shareholders 
* Averages are for the three years 1996 to 1998. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Websiters versus Non-websiters 
Variable Statistic All 
Companies 
Non-websiters Websiters 
Size     
Market capitalisation 
($'000) 
Mean 4,928,743.17 69,167.79 7,995,465.50
 Median 61,587.68 28,188.00 148,404.88
 Std Deviation 57,348,276.58 102,662.27 73,212,648.43
 Percentile 25 14,500.21 7,532.76 23,370.81
 Percentile 75 277,459.53 78,057.36 617,455.00
Total assets ($'000) Mean 1,584,219.04 151,612.04 2,489,023.45
 Median 101,546.77 47,463.50 218,826.83
 Std Deviation 5,302,146.81 290,031.16 6,621,091.10
 Percentile 25 30,986.00 14,006.33 56,805.82
 Percentile 75 521,811.33 139,669.42 1,852,495.33
Turnover ($'000) Mean 799,778.53 106,564.63 1,235,337.70
 Median 58,552.33 24,334.96 148,928.00
 Std Deviation 2,842,712.97 285,000.03 3,557,668.03
 Percentile 25 6,772.33 238.00 20,465.67
 Percentile 75 369,583.42 87,960.33 875,213.08
Number of employees Mean 1574 614 2222
 Median 301 89 587
 Std Deviation 5374 1523 6783
 Percentile 25 61 25 155
 Percentile 75 1119 450 1768
   
Profitability   
Growth Mean -.03 -.02 -.04
 Median -.03 -.07 .00
 Std Deviation 1.65 1.86 1.48
 Percentile 25 -.40 -.41 -.34
 Percentile 75 .33 .09 .41
Profit before interest and 
tax  
Mean 79,802.27 8,770.64 124,432.77
($'000) Median 10,083.83 1,743.67 18,604.33
 Std Deviation 221,489.62 27,221.95 272,920.14
 Percentile 25 .00 -136.33 3,170.17
 Percentile 75 52,477.75 11,443.00 95,000.31
Profit after tax ($'000) Mean 38,808.98 3,688.14 60,990.57
 Median 5,563.83 48.33 10,978.33
 Std Deviation 96,090.15 24,525.83 116,001.04
 Percentile 25 -162.11 -573.10 812.33
 Percentile 75 23,609.00 6,370.83 58,327.89
Return on equity Mean .09 .00 .15
 Median .06 .02 .07
 Std Deviation .81 .23 1.00
 Percentile 25 -.01 -.08 .02
 Percentile 75 .12 .10 .13
Return on total asset Mean .02 .01 .02
 Median .03 .01 .04
 Std Deviation .17 .21 .13
 Percentile 25 -.01 -.04 .01
 Percentile 75 .07 .06 .07
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Table 4 (Continued) Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Websiters versus Non-websiters 
Variable Statistic All 
Companies 
Non-websiters Websiters 
     
Efficiency     
Operating expenses ($'000) Mean 492765.69 90189.10 745712.05
 Median 11116.67 12286.97 9880.33
 Std Deviation 2566974.10 275716.95 3248342.97
 Percentile 25 1588.14 1404.00 1615.05
 Percentile 75 54653.00 54677.00 49336.42
Operating expenses to sales Mean 1.23 1.65 .99
 Median .31 .90 .08
 Std Deviation 5.03 5.07 5.01
 Percentile 25 .05 .69 .03
 Percentile 75 .94 .99 .51
Liquidity     
Cash Assets     
 Mean 97,193.89 3,193.97 156,255.78
 Median 2,418.95 428.00 5,613.67
 Std Deviation 515,446.87 9,402.80 651,870.39
 Percentile 25 55.58 -296.33 827.92
 Percentile 75 14,967.29 3,555.33 33,237.47
Cash assets by total assets Mean .13 .06 .17
 Median .02 .01 .03
 Std Deviation .43 .17 .52
 Percentile 25 .00 -.01 .00
 Percentile 75 .10 .06 .10
     
Others     
Overseas listing? Count: Yes 
             No 
74
155
30 
76 
44
79
Location of control Count: Foreign 
            NZ 
84
128
31 
59 
53
69
Share spread Mean 72.81 73.02 72.68
 Median 79.06 79.88 78.97
 Std Deviation 20.60 23.15 19.00
 Percentile 25 60.70 62.77 58.32
 Percentile 75 88.66 90.53 86.35
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Table 4 (Continued): Descriptive statistics 
Panel B: IFRC versus N-IFRC 
Variable Statistics Non-IF Reporters IF Reporters 
Size    
Market capitalisation 
($'000) 
Mean $375,772.58 $11,421,350.
40 
 Median $98,147.37 $176,251.15 
 Std Deviation $806,199.36 $87,063,190.
04 
 Percentile 25 $10,837.73 $50,049.25 
 Percentile 75 $410,915.80 $783,505.63 
Total assets ($'000) Mean $795,884.68 $3,217,715.4
7 
 Median $126,097.00 $264,802.68 
 Std Deviation $1,946,654.64 $7,704,659.7
5 
 Percentile 25 $49,982.17 $58,381.64 
 Percentile 75 $462,610.08 $2,792,091.6
7 
Turnover ($'000) Mean $424,747.68 $1,589,981.3
5 
 Median $136,269.33 $155,924.33 
 Std Deviation $814,561.66 $4,180,434.3
7 
 Percentile 25 $19,359.00 $21,756.67 
 Percentile 75 $372,416.58 $1,282,366.8
9 
Number of employees Mean 797.14 2832.26 
 Median 315.17 765.00 
 Std Deviation 1089.38 8019.75 
 Percentile 25 190.50 120.75 
 Percentile 75 915.00 2978.08 
   
Profitability   
Growth Mean -.15 .09 
 Median -.05 .00 
 Std Deviation 1.47 1.34 
 Percentile 25 -.60 -.28 
 Percentile 75 .46 .44 
Profit before interest and 
tax  
Mean $46,976.13 $158,385.48 
($'000) Median $12,397.00 $24,177.28 
 Std Deviation $92,654.08 $315,470.19 
 Percentile 25 $4,477.92 $2,408.33 
 Percentile 75 $52,069.25 $187,307.50 
Profit after tax ($'000) Mean $24,502.98 $76,826.81 
 Median $6,964.00 $17,240.68 
 Std Deviation $50,070.63 $131,802.83 
 Percentile 25 $768.83 $1,692.50 
 Percentile 75 $22,664.42 $95,892.17 
Return on equity Mean .07 .19 
 Median .07 .08 
 Std Deviation .16 1.20 
 Percentile 25 .04 .01 
 Percentile 75 .13 .12 
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Return on total asset Mean .04 .01 
 Median .04 .04 
 Std Deviation .12 .14 
 Percentile 25 .01 .01 
 Percentile 75 .08 .06 
Panel B: IFRC versus N-IFRC 
Variable Statistics Non-IF Reporters IF Reporters 
Efficiency   
Operating expenses ($'000) Mean 90498.82 1028827.55 
 Median 3896.33 15970.00 
 Std Deviation 406361.59 3848837.54 
 Percentile 25 770.33 2434.06 
 Percentile 75 15295.83 200209.51 
Operating expenses to sales Mean .09 1.36 
 Median .04 .12 
 Std Deviation .17 5.96 
 Percentile 25 .02 .04 
 Percentile 75 .07 .80 
Liquidity   
Cash Assets Mean $136,078.71 $166,553.35 
 Median $1,217.63 $10,915.33 
 Std Deviation $670,201.87 $652,172.36 
 Percentile 25 -$38.25 $1,480.13 
 Percentile 75 $9,871.67 $49,082.67 
Cash assets by total assets Mean .06 .21 
 Median .01 .03 
 Std Deviation .10 .61 
 Percentile 25 .00 .01 
 Percentile 75 .06 .13 
    
Others    
Overseas listing? Count: Yes 
             No 
4 
31
39 
48 
Location of control Count: Foreign 
            NZ 
9 
25
43 
44 
Share spread Mean 82.15 68.37 
 Median 84.39 73.92 
 Std Deviation 13.34 19.79 
 Percentile 25 76.79 51.80 
 Percentile 75 93.20 84.13 
 
 45
 
Table 5 
Univariate Sample T-Test of Independent Research Variables for N-IFRC  and IFRC listed 
Companies 
 
Research Mean Difference  Significance (2-tailed) 
Variable (Standard errors of mean) t-value  
Size    
MCAP -$11,045,577.82 
($10,407,017.44)
-1.06 .292 
TASS -$2,421,830.79 
($925,664.37)
-2.616 .010** 
SALE -$1,165,233.67 
($491,245.33)
2.372 .020** 
NEMP -2035.12 
(1094.51)
-1.859 .068* 
Profitability   
GRWT -.25 
(.30)
0.812 .420 
PBIT -$111,409.35 
($38,986.02)
2.858 .005*** 
PATX -$52,323.82 
($17,120.79)
3.056 .003*** 
ROEQ -0.12 
(0.14)
.869 .387 
ROTA 0.02 
(0.03)
.946 .347 
Efficiency   
OPEX -938328.72 
(438767.85)
2.139 .035** 
OEXS -1.27 
(0.69)
1.846 .069* 
Liquidity   
LIQD -$30,474.64 
($137,822.85)
-.221 .826 
LQTS -0.15 
(0.071)
-2.186 .031** 
Others    
SPRD 13.78 
(3.28)
4.203 .000*** 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6 
Multivariate Logistic Regression Results 
 
Model#  
Research Variable# 
 
Expected Sign A1 A2 B1 B2 
Constant  -0.6289 
(2.2504) 
-1.8638    
(2.9250) 
0.5758    
(2.4121) 
-1.4469    
(3.0631) 
Size + 0.9271*** 
(0.3594) 
1.7074***     
(0.5883) 
0.6362*    
(0.3519) 
1.0401** 
(0.4668) 
Industry ? 0.2025 
(0.1905) 
0.5407** 
(0.2682) 
0.0961     
(0.1704) 
0.2518 
(0.2025) 
Profitability +/- -0.9302 
(2.2536) 
-1.0118 
(2.5851) 
0.0003 
(0.0035) 
-O.0015 
(0.0045) 
Efficiency +/- 2.5761* 
(1.5404) 
5.0303* 
(2.8362) 
2.6833* 
(1.4698) 
6.9369* 
(3.8010) 
Growth +/- 0.2830 
(0.2223) 
0.0702     
(0.2348) 
0.3179     
(0.2235) 
0.4480     
(0.2870) 
Ownership Spread - -0.0566** 
(0.0254) 
-0.1089*** 
(0.0391) 
-0.0499**     
(0.0217) 
-0.0642**     
(0.0250) 
Internationalisation + 0.1214 
(0.9023) 
1.7377 
(1.4241) 
-0.7681     
(0.6484) 
-1.4033* 
(0.8458) 
Liquidity + -0.0447 
(0.0694) 
1.9558    
(1.6635) 
-0.0334     
(0.0638) 
2.8989    
(2.5646) 
      
     
Log likelihood  84.45% 63.50% 89.45% 71.91% 
Goodness of fit  81.71% 59.37% 77.90% 65.34% 
Chi2 statistics  30.125*** 44.267*** 29.042*** 41.16    
Number of observations  902 87 95 92 
Degrees of freedom  8 8 8 8 
Correctly predicted: N-IFR  56.67% 59.26% 50.00% 64.29% 
                                 IFR    85.00%   86.67%   86.15%   87.50% 
                               Overall  75.56%  78.16%  74.74%  80.43% 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
# Explanatory variables for the models are: Size = log of market capitalisation (A1 and A2), log of total 
assets (B1 and B2); Industry = industrial sector; Profitability = return on equity (A1 and A2), earnings per 
share (B1 and B2); Efficiency = operating expenses to sales; Growth = increase in share value; Ownership 
spread = Proportion of shares held by top 40% of shareholders; Internationalisation = overseas listing (A1 
and A2), Foreign or New Zealand-controlled (B1 and B2); Liquidity = cash assets by total assets. 
 
